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1 | BAYES: LOCAL AND IMPERIAL
Bayesianism, in one form or another, has never been more popular than it is now. Its use in normative
inquiries (e.g., in formal epistemology) has been prominent for some time. But recently theorists have
tried to extend Bayesianism to a series of descriptive endeavors. A decade or so ago, only a handful
of cognitive scientists had attempted to explain mental processing by Bayesian lights (e.g., Glymour,
2003; Gopnik et al., 2004; Tenenbaum, 1999). Now, anywhere one looks one can see philosophers
and cognitive scientists alluding to Bayes' rule in order to explain some phenomenon or another.1
Bayesianism's appeal is not hard to see: it allows for the possibility of a single mental
mechanism—Bayesian updating—to unify mental processes as diverse as word learning (Xu &
Tenenbaum, 2007), belief updating (Bennett, 2015), conditional reasoning (Oaksford & Chater,
1994), the development of moral judgments (Nichols, Kumar, Lopez, Ayars & Chan, 2016),
domain-general reasoning (Vul & Pashler, 2008), predictive coding (Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013),
1 Bayes rule: P(H|E) = P(H) × P(E|H)/P(E). P(x) stands for the probability of x; E and H stand for evidence and hypothesis respec-
tively, so that the formula reads: The probability of the hypothesis given the evidence (the “conditional probability”) is equal to the
probability of the hypothesis (the “prior”) multiplied by the evidence given the hypothesis (the “likelihood”). The product of the prior
and the likelihood is then divided by the probability of the evidence.
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compositionality in the Language of Thought (Goodman et al., 2015a), causal reasoning (Gweon &
Schulz, 2011), and reinforcement learning (Vlassis, Ghavamzadeh, Mannor & Poupart, 2012) to
name just a few recent domains of interesting work falling under the Bayesian banner. The sheer
generality of Bayesianism allows a scope unmatched by most theories, save for discredited ones like
Radical Behaviorism (Skinner, 1974) and Associationism (Mandelbaum, 2016).
Moreover, if one tries to reverse engineer the mind, Bayesianism has few competitors
(Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths & Goodman, 2011). Though there are other computational models one
can use that are not necessarily Bayesian, the relative success of Bayesian models in engineering and
machine learning should bolster one's confidence in Bayesianism.2
But what exactly is descriptive—as opposed to normative—Bayesianism (hereafter referred to
simply as “Bayesianism”)? Since there is no simple idea that separates out Bayesians from non-
Bayesians, it will take a bit of work to detail the contours of the theory. We can start by separating
Bayesians into idealized two camps. Call the first “Imperial Bayesians.” Imperial Bayesians think that
the Bayes' rule is, in some way or another, approximated by all mental processes. For Imperialists, it
is not an accident that Bayesian analyses are applicable to a wide range of phenomena, since they
believe that all mental processing—perception and cognition—aims at approximating a Bayesian
ideal. In contrast to Imperial Bayesians there are what I will call “Local Bayesians.” Local Bayesians
differ from Imperial Bayesians merely in the scope of their theories: whereas Imperialists think all
mental processing is Bayesian, Localists think that only some mental processes are Bayesian (and
may be agnostic on the global question). That is, Localists can still posit a heterogeneous array of
mental mechanisms, of which Bayesian processing is just one. Arguing that all forms of Local Baye-
sianism are false root and branch would thus be a fairly impossible task: to argue that no mental pro-
cess is Bayesian, one would have to go through each mental process one by one showing that its
processing cannot be interpreted in a Bayesian fashion. For the rest of the essay, I will remain mostly
neutral on the question of the truth of Local Bayes. Instead, my focus will be on Imperial Bayes.
A few caveats before we continue. First, Imperial Bayes is an idealization—no particular theorist
may hold the exact Imperial Bayes position—though positions reasonably close to it are widely held
(e.g., Clark, 2013; Friston, 2012; Hohwy, 2013; Oaksford & Chater, 2009; Tenenbaum et al., 2011).3
Accordingly, my aim is to detail problems with a wide range of positions, not to critique any particu-
lar theorist. Second, many of the criticisms of Imperial Bayes will apply to specific applications of
Local Bayes. Since the bulk of my critique will focus on particular examples, this critique can also be
read as a criticism of those forms of Local Bayes.
2 | THE ALGORITHMIC AND COMPUTATIONAL: OPTIMALITY AND
BAYESIANISM
Marr (1982) famously outlined three levels of explanatory desiderata for mental processes: the com-
putational, the algorithmic, and the implementational. The computational level describes the problem
the system is trying to solve. The algorithmic level describes the algorithms the process utilizes to
2 See, for example, Schmidhuber (2015) for an overview of (non-Bayesian) “deep learning” models.
3 One may be inclined to separate out the Methodological Imperialists from the Radical (or “fundamentalist,” Jones & Love, 2011)
Imperialists, just as one might have for Behaviorism. As far as I can tell, Clark and Hohwy are more akin to the radical end of the spec-
trum, whereas Tenenbaum and his collaborators are inclined towards the methodological position. As a reviewer notes, one might also
want to be an Imperialist about just unconscious processes but stay silent on conscious processes. Of course, because of the idealization
in the characterization, positions will vary along a continuum.
2 MANDELBAUM
solve the problem specified at the computational level. Finally, the implementational level describes
how the algorithms are physically implemented.
Part of the value of the computational level is purported to be that specifying the problem that
the system is trying to solve should help constrain the types of solutions the system might use—that
is, the computational level goals should constrain our search for algorithmic level models
(Oaksford & Chater, 2009). There has been confusion as to whether Bayesianism is meant to apply
to the computational or algorithmic level (Jones & Love, 2011; Oaksford & Chater, 2007). Compu-
tational Bayesians claim that Bayesian analysis shows how a system would solve a problem, assum-
ing it were to solve it optimally. Computational Bayesians are thus another variety of normative
Bayesians, and are technically agnostic as to how actual mental processing unfolds. In contrast,
algorithmic Bayesians make claims about how actual mental processing works. Algorithmic Bayes-
ians are committed to the idea that the optimal, rational way for a mental mechanism to solve a
given problem is the actual way the mental mechanism solves the problem. It is the algorithmic con-
ception of Bayesianism that is committed to descriptive answers for how we process and, conse-
quently, algorithmic (and not merely computational) Bayes is the position that is the aim of my
critique.4
Abstractly, my strategy is as follows: find some process p for which theorists claim p operates in
an optimal Bayesian way when solving a task t. If it can be shown that p does not so operate in an
optimal way, then we can conclude that (a) Local Bayesianism is false with regard to p and
(b) Imperial Bayesianism is false tout court.
There are hurdles to meet along the way. For one thing, merely showing that p sometimes acts in
a suboptimal way would not itself be enough to disprove that p is in fact optimal for solving t. It
might be that p's suboptimality in this case is not due to its core processing, but due to some perfor-
mance constraint or other. That is, one could still hold that the core competence of p is optimal in
regards to t but also believe that sometimes outside factors conspire so that p performs suboptimally.5
This is not a mere possibility, but instead a serious problem that grinds most discussions of the data
to a standstill. For a concrete example, take the heuristics and biases literature, which is rife with find-
ings about human irrationality. We are forever hearing how people ignore base rates (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1973), fall for the conjunction fallacy (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973, are deceived by the dis-
junction effect (Tversky & Shafir, 1992), insufficiently adjust from irrelevant anchors (Epley & Gilo-
vich, 2001), affirm the consequent (Wason, 1971), probability match instead of maximize (West &
Stanovich, 2003), and on and on. Against this backdrop it strikes some as absurd that anyone could
argue for optimality. But it is not. As Bayesians (and others) stress, the heuristics and biases project
was set against a backdrop of appreciation of human rationality. Part of the genius of the original
Kahneman and Tversky (1973, p. 237) research was creating experimental situations that would reli-
ably cause people to act irrationally. For every article showing that “…people do not appear to follow
the calculus of chance or the statistical theory of prediction,” one can find an article showing people
excelling at the same task. So what are we to do when we find evidence that college students from
4 Danks (2013) argues that Marr's three levels are cross-cut by questions of instrumentalism(/realism) and optimality. Because of this,
Danks argues that one cannot merely equate computational level processing with optimal processing. I agree with the general moral
Danks draws, but in the specific case of Bayesian processing theorists are in fact explicitly committed to the optimality condition (see,
e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 1994; Weiss, Simoncelli & Adelson, 2002; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2006; Norris, 2006; Bogacz, 2007; Feld-
man, Griffiths & Morgan, 2009; Girshick, Landy & Simoncelli, 2011). It is the commitment to optimal processing that is the hallmark
of Bayesian theories—the more one loosens this commitment, the less clear it is that the theory under scrutiny is Bayesian (as opposed
to, say, any old theory of utilizing probabilistic updating in some fashion). For critiques of Bayesianism because of its connection to
optimality, see Jones & Love, 2011; Elqayam & Evans, 2011; Bowers & Davis, 2012.
5 Or maybe it is not that p processes suboptimally per se, but instead that p looks to be engaged but is in fact bypassed, or that p in fact
did process optimally, but its output was overridden by a separate process, or any other way that ceteris may not be paribus.
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elite universities unabashedly ignore base rates Kahneman and Tversky (1973, p. 237) while 4-year-
olds successfully incorporate base rates (Sobel, Tenenbaum & Gopnik, 2004)?
To break this deadlock, we need to do more than just find examples where people appear to be
acting irrationally. What would be needed to show that Local Bayesianism is false is to find actions
that are not just the result of errors in processing. Rather, the irrationality has to result from a system
that is set up to properly output the actions we categorize as irrational.
But perhaps even irrational outputs will not be enough in themselves to truly worry Bayesians,
for paradigmatic outputs—decisions, motor behaviors, and the like—are interaction effects. What
would be truly worrisome is if we found a process that updated in a decidedly non-Bayesian fashion.
We must find suboptimal processing that is, from the standpoint of the processor, its proper function-
ing. To put it in our earlier terms, what would be maximally worrisome for the Bayesian would be to
show that the core competence of process p in solving t is, in fact, nonoptimal from the Bayesian's
own sense of optimality.
Because of the vast differences in tasks, having a sense of what optimality is across the board is
difficult. Nevertheless, Bayesians do provide us with one fixed point which can be utilized regardless
of domain: Bayes' rule. Bayes' rule is purported to be the core of optimal processing itself—it is
where the normative meets the descriptive. So, if we can find some p whose core processing itself
contravenes the Bayes' rule, then we can be assured that Local Bayes is false for p and that Imperial
Bayes is false.
But what p should one choose to investigate? In order to make the case against Bayes as strong
as possible it is best to use a domain at which Bayesianism is most at home: belief updating. After
all, Bayes' rule is most easily understood and discussed as a way of updating one's (or a process's)
beliefs (/credences)6 about a given hypothesis. As such, almost any account of Bayesian processing
appears to be a version of Bayesian belief updating. Thus if we can show that belief updating itself
is, at its core, deeply nonoptimal in a way that contravenes Bayes' rule, we can cast skepticism on the
broader Bayesian enterprise.
3 | PROBLEMS FOR THE BAYESIAN
In this section, I will canvass some of the problems for Bayesianism. Because of space constraints, I
will leave out many issues that are either not as dire as the ones I discuss, or that have been discussed
elsewhere.7
3.1 | Psychological reality
Bayesians are, in some sense, committed to the idea that we update our beliefs via Bayes' rule. But I
can find no theorist who actually thinks that humans update by using an explicit representation of the
Bayes' rule. For one thing, although updating via Bayes' rule may be possible in some very circum-
scribed experimental settings, it would be intractable to do so in real life reasoning. One could not
have a fully delineated and explicit hypothesis space that one updates every time new data is received
6 The question of whether it is beliefs or credences that are updated is orthogonal to my focus, and I wish to remain neutral on it for
the present discussion. For readability, I will refer to “beliefs” but readers should feel free to substitute “credences” as they see fit.
7 For critiques regarding overfitting, see Endress, 2013; for worries about variability in decision rules and ad hoc model selection, see
Marcus & Davis, 2013; for problems with probability matching, see Eberhardt & Danks, 2011. For some reasonable responses from
prominent Bayesians, see Frank, 2013 and Goodman, Tenenbaum & Gerstenberg, 2015b.
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(which, on some reasonable readings of new data, is each new instant).8 A psychologically literal
Bayesian model would also force cognizers to search through all of the posterior distribution in real
time, which would be seemingly impossible—the combinatorial explosion would be immense.9 Thus,
there is a search among Bayesians to find algorithms that approximate Bayesian inference (Vul,
Goodman, Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2014). For example, some have posited that knowledge represen-
tations take the form of probabilistic distributions, and that Bayes' rule is approximated in part via
sampling from such distributions (Vul et al., 2014).10 In fact, it is recently been argued that mere
sampling from the posterior is almost as optimal (for decision making) as using the full posterior,
even when one just takes a single sample from the posterior (and often it looks like single samples
are themselves pragmatically ideal; Vul et al., 2014).
Although the questions of psychological reality are important, I find them a bit less pressing than
others. For one thing, they have been known for some time (see, e.g., Gigerenzer, 2008); for another,
figuring out the actual psychological implementation (i.e., the algorithmic-level explanation) for
Bayesian reasoning is an active research program, one which many clever theorists are currently
engaged in. To bemoan the project because it is in medias res seems shortsighted. Nevertheless, how
one thinks this program will turn out will inform how optimistic one is about the long-term prospects
of a Bayesian cognitive science. For what it is worth, although I think Bayesianism is probably not
true of how we update beliefs, I do not think its falsity is due to the impossibility of having evolved
an approximate Bayesian processor.
But the problem of psychological reality puts an earlier worry into sharper focus: if we cannot
rely on Bayes' rule being explicitly represented and followed, then how can we import a sense of
optimality across tasks, even tasks about belief updating? If we are just approximating an optimal
updater, then would deviations from the optimal really be counterexamples?
In order to get around this worry one would need to show evidence that no approximate Bayesian
processor, no matter how it is instantiated, should ever produce. Moreover, to be maximally convinc-
ing such evidence must be caused by a process whose function it is to produce such outputs. Focus-
ing on belief updating, we have three candidates: in the first case, we fail to learn information that we
should learn (a type of learning blindness), and in the second, we do not update when we should
update (belief perseverance). The third and most pressing case is one of learning perversity—
receiving evidence that ~P and yet increasing our belief that P.
3.2 | Belief perseverance and not learning what should be learned
It is long been known that an organism does not learn everything one's learning theory predicts it
should. Associationists and Behaviorists predicted that whatever properties were associated
(or reinforced) in one's environment should be thereby associated in one's mind. But there are always
more combinations of properties instantiated (/reinforced) in one's environment than are ever learned.
Consider a rat in a cage that, on some pattern of reinforcement, will be shocked in conjunction with
being shown a light. A problem for Behaviorists was to explain why, given some pattern of reinforce-
ments, rats would learn that the light leads to the shock but given other patterns, rats would learn that
8 For a concrete example, see Endress (2013), who calculates that the Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) model would demand that
infants process 900 counterfactual syllable triplets (e.g., di di je) per second.
9 It is worth noting that Bayesians are not the only ones in this type of predicament. Chomsky's Minimalist Program (Chomsky, 1995)
appears to have similar consequences (e.g., see the extreme amount of possible sentences that are partially derived but crash before
Spell-Out).
10 “In part” is there because there is much more to Bayesian (or any) decision making than merely sampling from a posterior—one
must also use the posterior (or samples of ) to make a decision of what one should do. Sampling from the posterior does not in and of
itself dictate one's decision (or response), though it is often useful to speak as if it did.
MANDELBAUM 5
the cage itself leads to the shock, ignoring the role of the light altogether (Mandelbaum, 2016).
Though Associationists and Behaviorists did not have the theoretical tools to predict these patterns of
learning, the Bayesians do: the rats will learn whatever stimulus is a better predictor of the shock.
The reliance on prediction allows Bayesians to explain lots of instances of failures to learn that
Associationists and Behaviorists could not (see, e.g., Bayesian explanation of Kamin blocking (Sobel
et al., 2004). But Imperial Bayesians also have problems explaining why some information that
should be learned is not. Perceptual examples abound. One can know that the figures in the Ames
room are the same height or the lines of the Müller–Lyer are the same length and yet one cannot learn
to see it so.
Though the failures of perceptual systems to learn, or update, some information is a problem for
Imperial Bayesianism, these failures do not strike at the core of Bayesianism. For instance, one can
deal with these failures by adding a bit more structure to the overall architecture of the mind. An
Imperial Bayesian can posit that perceptual systems are encapsulated from the rest of the mind and
perhaps such encapsulation would be enough to explain away the lack of updating in perceptual sys-
tems.11 Moreover, perhaps the Bayesian will have to posit some innate information—such as the
(possibly) innate information that there is only one overhead light source. But doing so need not
affect the core of Bayesianism. After all, priors have to come from somewhere, and it is empiricism,
not Bayesianism per se that is at odds with innate priors.
But the problems are not that simple to sidestep. Similar lack of learning can be seen in cognition.
Rats are prepared to learn that an audiovisual stimulus signals a shock, and they are prepared to learn
that a gustatory stimulus signals nausea. Indeed, they are so “prepared” to learn this that they need
only one instance to make the induction (Garcia & Koelling, 1966). But rats are contraprepared to
learn that an audiovisual stimulus signals nausea or that a gustatory stimulus signals shock; that is,
they cannot learn these contingencies (Garcia & Koelling, 1966).12
But again, the enlightened Imperial Bayesian can, by invoking a little architecture and nativism,
explain away these presumptive counterexamples. Taste aversion learning is innate if anything is,
and one can imagine priors for contingencies here being close to 1 or unmovable because of how they
are otherwise stored. Some Bayesians, like Tenenbaum, welcome nativism (though others—like
Clark and Hohwy—do not particularly). The more one resists nativism and other architectural con-
straints, the bigger these problems are. But not all problems of failures to learn involve evolutionarily
significant properties (see Danks, 2006). And regardless, there are central problems afoot for all
Bayesians when it comes to belief perseverance for properties that are not evolutionarily significant,
problems that no amount of nativism or architecture can help solve.
Take a moment to think about the relationship between firefighters and risk preference. Do you
think better firefighters are more risk averse or more risk seeking? If you are like most people stud-
ied, you (a) have no antecedent opinion and (b) can easily think up causal stories to explain why
either case would be true. In a series of studies, Anderson and colleagues examined belief persever-
ance about firefighting and risk preference (Anderson, 1983; Anderson, Lepper & Ross, 1980;
Anderson & Sechler, 1986; Slusher & Anderson, 1989). Subjects were induced to form a theory
11 Note that, although it is consistent for an Imperial Bayesian to believe in informational encapsulation of perceptual systems, believ-
ing in full-fledged modularity would be more or less impossible. That is because modularity entails that the different modules utilize
different domain-specific algorithms (Mandelbaum, 2017). It is the idea of a disparate suite of domain-specific algorithms that is incon-
sistent with Imperial Bayes.
12 Interestingly enough, humans cannot either (Baeyens, Eelen, Van den Bergh & Crombez, 1990). For example, imagine becoming
nauseated after drinking something that was floridly colored and had a particular aftertaste. People will not infer that it was the coloring
that made them sick, only the taste; they will freely drink other substances that have the same color, but none that have the same smell
or taste.
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about the connection in a number of different ways—for example, by reading fictitious case histo-
ries or encountering fictitious data. Other subjects were merely asked to think about one type of rela-
tionship. Subjects in all the conditions were then given counterattitudinal evidence—evidence that
the relationship was actually the opposite of what they had thought. Whether subjects read anecdotes
or perused charts, and whether they came up with their own causal link between the properties or
were merely given one by the experimenters, all subjects showed the same tendency to have their
beliefs persevere in the face of the counterevidence. This held regardless of how the counterevidence
was presented. Even those subjects who merely contemplated a hypothetical relationship between
risk-seekingness and firefighting would stubbornly adhere to that belief when confronted with (fic-
tional) mounds of data that seemed to conclusively show a contradictory link between risk-aversion
and firefighting.
Belief intransigence of this sort is deeply problematic for the Imperial Bayesian. After all,
learning causal connections between two seemingly disparate properties is exactly the type of sce-
nario for which Bayesian updating is tailor-made. Nevertheless, if one looks in the right way, one
can find belief perseverance in many causal learning paradigms.13 For instance, subjects in Taylor
and Ahn (2012) were tasked with learning the causal connections between fictitious diseases. In
the first 20 trials, subjects were introduced to two fictitious diseases B(urlosis) and C(aprix). Each
trial was supposedly another patient's chart and the patient could have B, C, both, or neither. Sub-
jects were also told that there may be other conditions not yet listed here that may be introduced
later. After 20 trials, subjects easily formed beliefs between the absence and presence of the two
properties. Let's take, for instance, a subject that was in the condition where having B predicted
having C (i.e., the patient would see that any patient that had C would also have B, and any patient
that did not have C did not have B). Such a subject reliably formed the belief that B led to C. After
the 20 trials, subjects were then introduced to another fictitious disease A(blique) and asked what
the relationship between the three diseases were. Just as in Kamin blocking, subjects were
“blocked” here. Even given another 20 trials where A in fact lead to both B and C, subjects would
persevere in their original hypothesis. Taylor and Ahn could not model the results using any Bayes-
ian models, but the problem here is larger than just this one study: the moral is that paradigms
where we should be seeing the most Bayesian successes—causal learning paradigms—in fact lead
to failures of belief updating because of belief perseverance. The Bayesian challenge is to explain
how such perseverance is consistent with Bayesianism and to predict when such perseverance will
arise.
3.3 | Belief polarization
The biggest stumbling block for Bayesian theories of belief updating is a species of belief polariza-
tion. Though it is often discussed as a single phenomenon, “belief polarization” is an umbrella term
covering two distinct effects, biased assimilation-based polarization and belief disconfirmation-based
polarization. I take these in turn.
3.3.1 | Polarization via biased assimilation
By far the most widely discussed polarization phenomenon is biased assimilation. Biased assimilation
is a phenomenon about how people gather and scrutinize evidence. For example, in the most-cited
13 Sadly, one also finds it wherever the (in)effectiveness of debriefing is under investigation (e.g., Ross, Lepper & Hubbard, 1975;
Valins, 1974; Wegner, Coulton & Wenzlaff, 1985), or in studies of misinformation more generally (e.g., Ecker, Lewandowsky, Swire &
Chang, 2011).
MANDELBAUM 7
biased assimilation study, subjects were given equivocal evidence about the efficacy of the death pen-
alty (Lord, Ross & Lepper, 1979). Specifically, they encountered two pieces of inconsistent evidence:
one a summary of a study that claimed that states that had the death penalty subsequently had lower
murder rates, and the other a summary asserting the opposite; that states with the death penalty had
higher murder rates than states without.
Prima facie, one might think that when one is confronted with equivocal evidence, one's beliefs
should become, if anything, more tempered, not more extreme. Frustratingly, that is rarely the case;
instead, subjects' beliefs strengthen in the direction of their antecedently held belief. For instance,
death penalty proponents end up being even more prodeath penalty after receiving equivocal evi-
dence, while the death penalty opponents become even more anti-death penalty.14 Though the Lord
study just mentioned is the most discussed result of the literature, it is not nearly the first. It came
after almost two decades of dissonance research into the “selective exposure” effect (Brock & Bal-
loun, 1967; Zillmann & Bryant, 2013). Selective exposure effects work in a similar way to Lord
et al.’s study, with the one important difference being that subjects in a selective exposure paradigm
are allowed to choose whether to encounter or avoid certain pieces of information. To use a canonical
example, imagine a subject who was deciding between buying a Honda and a Toyota, and recently
decided to buy the Honda. This subject might then be given a magazine that contains advertisements
for both Toyotas and Hondas and asked to peruse the magazine at her leisure. Experimenters would
then surreptitiously track how long she looked at Honda ads and Toyota ads as she thumbed through
the magazine. Subjects who just bought a Honda would spend much more time looking at Honda ads
than at Toyota ads, and spend very little if any time looking at Toyota ads. Seeing the proattitudinal
advertisement would then lead the subjects to become more confident in their antecedent attitude
(that Hondas are better than Toyotas).
In both biased assimilation and selective exposure experiments we find a type of belief polariza-
tion. But the polarization here is in how one handles the evidence before them. In the selective expo-
sure paradigm the workings of dissonance dictate where the subjects will attend. For example, the
more strongly the subjects hold their beliefs, the more strongly they will avoid counterattitudinal evi-
dence and encounter proattitudinal evidence (Brannon, Tagler & Eagly, 2007). The effect here is
really one of avoidance—just like the patient who avoids the doctor's call to maintain their belief in
their health, the subject's antecedent belief keeps them sequestered away from information which
might disconfirm what they believe.
Unlike the selective exposure researchers, Lord et al. (1979) did not control for different
mechanisms that could lead to their biased assimilation, though one can still speculate. It is rea-
sonable to suppose that their finding is due to differential scrutiny, where subjects thought much
harder about the counterattitudinal studies than the proattitudinal ones. The more effort they put
in, the more counterarguments they came up with; when they compared their counterexamples to
the lack of counterexamples that arose for the proattitudinal information (due to their lack of try-
ing to produce such counterexamples) they not only reaffirm but also strengthen their antecedent
beliefs.
This type of differential scrutiny is predicted by various theories of persuasion (Festinger & Mac-
coby, 1964; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), and differs from the mechanisms at play in selective exposure.
Nevertheless, both of these effects pertain to how one gathers evidence: in the one case we ignore
evidence, in the other we choose which evidence to scrutinize and which to leave be. Although at
first blush biased assimilation seems quite irrational, when seen as a phenomenon of evidence
14 What a “proponent” amounted to is someone who antecedently supported the death penalty, thought it had a deterrent effect, and
thought the studies backed them up (mutatis mutandis for the death penalty opponent).
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gathering one can argue for its rationality. For instance, Kelly (2008) has argued that a rational person
could show these biased assimilation effects.15 Jern, Chang and Kemp (2014) have even gone further
to produce Bayesian models that entail biased assimilation effects.16 Perhaps one can make amend-
ments so that this type of polarization is not really a problem.17
Thus we reach what appears to be another standstill: even though biased assimilation looks bad at
first pass, perhaps Bayesians can handle the phenomenon. But the other type of polarization
evidence—what happens when one's belief is disconfirmed—has been ignored by all parties in the
debate. And it is this evidence that cannot be handled by Bayesian theories of any stripe. Once this
effect is clear, we can turn back to the modeling of biased assimilation and see how poorly Bayesian
models actually handle the data.
3.3.2 | Polarization via belief disconfirmation
In the late 1800s, August Petermann was the world's most famous geographer. This was all the more
impressive for his being an armchair geographer—he rarely left his perch in Gotha, Germany. In par-
ticular, Petermann was famous for his maps of the Polar regions, and he was a loud proponent of the
“open polar sea” theory—the idea that the ice pack in the Arctic thinned out as one reached the North
Pole. Petermann hypothesized that in the summer the northern Arctic Ocean would be totally free of
ice. Of course, he never saw any such thing—in part because he never made it anywhere near the
Arctic, and in part because the hypothesis is not true. Nevertheless, his reputation lent credence to the
open polar sea hypothesis and multiple voyages attempted to reach the pole, risking their lives on
Petermann's guess. In 1875, the HMS Discovery and the HMS Alert set off to win the pole, only to
find that Petermann was wrong—there was no open polar sea, just a solid sea of ice. After battling
scurvy, snow-blindness, and other maladies, the ships broke free of the pack ice and returned to the
United Kingdom with the news that there was no open polar sea. Though such news echoed what
was already known from other disasters (such as the 1871 voyage of the Polaris which met with a
similar fate) when Petermann found out that his theory was disconfirmed he doubled down on the
theory, not just having the belief persist, but instead actually increase in strength. Petermann began to
openly proselytize to others, lobbying the German government to sponsor an expedition to the pole.
When Germany would not finance an expedition, Petermann turned his efforts to America, and con-
vinced the owner of the New York Herald (James Gordon Bennett) and the US Navy to back another
expedition to the North Pole through the open polar sea. The result was the catastrophic voyage of
the USS Jeanette (Sides, 2014).
What caused Petermann to increase his confidence in the open polar sea hypothesis even after
receiving the earlier gruesome disconfirming evidence? And more importantly, was he particularly
special in his irrationality? Seemingly not. There is a long history of people increasing their beliefs
after receiving disconfirming evidence. The locus classicus for such evidence is Festinger, Riecken
and Schachter (1956), where researchers tracked a millennial cult. The cult predicted that the world
would end on December 21, 1954. Cult members did not merely make some assertions that the world
15 Kelly's (condensed) reasoning is that the question of how much time one should devote to counterattitudinal evidence is a practical
one, not necessarily an epistemic one. So, the argument goes, a person might be perfectly rational even though they ignore counteratti-
tudinal evidence because they formed their original beliefs in a warranted way and people incur no extra epistemic demand to devote
time to counterattitudinal evidence.
16 That said, I find the Jern et al. models to be implausible, as it is difficult to believe that people actually have priors similar to the
ones built into their models. For example, in order to explain the Lord et al., the model dictates that people assume (a) that all studies
are infused with research bias (so that researchers just uncover effects that are consistent with their own beliefs) and (b) that the major-
ity of people disagree with one's own opinion. No evidence is given for either prior, and (b) in particular seems quite hard to swallow
as it goes against the “false consensus effect”.
17 See Bowers and Davis (2012) for some forceful critiques of ad hoc amendments.
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would end then—they staked their lives and reputations on it, quitting their jobs, emptying their sav-
ings, and preparing for their future life postdestruction.18 When the date came and went, the group
had their belief in the world's impending destruction emphatically disconfirmed. Yet after the discon-
firmation the cult members did not merely accept the disconfirmation, decrease their belief accord-
ingly, and lower their commitment to the group's prophecies; rather, they increased their commitment
to the cult and began proselytizing in earnest. Again, there was nothing particularly special about this
millennial cult: members of 12 of the 13 cults who had made specific millennial prophecies
(i.e., picked a particular date on which the world would end), increased their proselytizing and their
beliefs in the cult postprophecy disconfirmation (Dawson, 1999).
There are reasons one might be skeptical of these data. For one thing, the number of cults one
can track is small. Accordingly, one might think that there are so few of these millennial cults
because very few people are so irrational. These are cult members after all. Moreover, we do not
exactly know what happens with their particular belief. Sure they believed in the cult, but what about
their belief that the world would end on a particular day—did they increase their credence in that
proposition after disconfirmation?
Such worries make the cult literature more suggestive than deeply problematic. But the theme is
replicable experimentally in populations outside of cult members, even when we keep the belief's
content fixed. And it is this datum—people increasing their belief that P after receiving evidence that
not-P—that Bayesianism cannot handle. Take, for instance, Batson (1975), where subjects were split
into two groups—those who antecedently believed that Jesus was the Son of God and those who did
not. Subjects were then asked to read an article they were told was “denied publication in the
New York Times at the request of the World Council of Churches because of the obvious crushing
effect it would have on the entire Christian world” (p. 180). The article explained that “scholars in
Jordan have conclusively proved that the major writings in what is today called the New Testament
are fraudulent” for archeologists had unearthed letters from the authors of the New Testament which
stated that they knew that Jesus was not the Son of God (Batson, 1975).19 The article went on to say
that through radiocarbon dating the letters were shown to be real, and thus the head researcher on the
project was forced to reluctantly conclude that the letters are authentic.
After reading the article, participants were then asked to do two things: say whether or not they
believed the article, and then take another test, which would track how their attitudes about Jesus had
changed. The results were instructive. Unsurprisingly, those who did not believe that Jesus was the
Son of God tended to believe the article, and then increased their belief that Jesus was not the Son of
God. Those who did believe that Jesus was the Son of God and did not believe the truth of the article
did not have their belief that Jesus was the Son of God change at all. This is also unsurprising: most
of these participants had a strong belief to begin with, and the easiest thing for them to do was to
reject the potentially disconfirming evidence. Once such evidence was rejected, their belief was no
longer under threat and need not be managed at all in either direction.
However, the most interesting results came from the group consisting of antecedent believers
who also believed the article to be true. These participants both believed that P (that Jesus was the
Son of God) and also agreed that they just received evidence that not-P. Like Petermann and the mil-
lennial cultists before them, these subjects increased their belief that P in the face of evidence that
18 They thought they would be whisked aboard an alien spaceship and avoid the world-destroying deluge.
19 In particular, the letters supposedly said, “I am sure we were justified in stealing away his body and claiming that he rose from the
dead. For, although his death clearly proves he was not the Son of God as we had hoped, if we did not claim that he was, both his great
teaching and our lives as his disciples would be wasted!” (Batson (1975), p. 180).
10 MANDELBAUM
they took to be disconfirming. That is, they now believed even more strongly that Jesus was the Son
of God after accepting information that purported to show that Jesus was not the Son of God.
One might be tempted to think that only the religious are irrational, but such a hypothesis is
unfounded. The belief disconfirmation effect—increasing a belief that P after receiving information
that not-P—is not bound to religion at all. One can uncover it in a variety of guises, whether one is
disconfirming the belief that there was a conspiracy to assassinate JFK (McHoskey, 1995), discon-
firming one's opinions on affirmative action and gun control (Taber & Lodge, 2006), disconfirming
one's belief that drinking coffee is not particularly unhealthy (Liberman & Chaiken, 1992), discon-
firming one's belief in the safety of nuclear power (Plous, 1991), disconfirming stereotypes about
homosexuals (Munro & Ditto, 1997), or disconfirming the societal utility of birth control
(Kiesler, 1971).
There are two morals worth highlighting from the belief disconfirmation effect. The first is that
the effect is anathema to any Bayesian model; one can choose whatever priors one would like, but an
updater that increases belief that P after receiving and accepting not-P cannot be a Bayesian updater.
The belief disconfirmation effect's power to break the Bayesian stalemate lies in its perversity: it dic-
tates that one increases their belief when one accepts that the belief is under legitimate threat.20 It is
this perversity of updating that is inherently anti-Bayesian. The second moral of the belief disconfir-
mation effect is that it is not accidental or due to some performance effect; rather, it arises because of
the workings of the psychological immune system.
4 | THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMMUNE SYSTEM
The last claim to be defended is that the belief disconfirmation effect is not a mere error in a system's
processing but rather stems from a system that is properly functioning. I do not intend to prove that
this is so, but instead to elucidate a hypothesis that entails the possibility, and show that for all we
know it is not false.
From decades of dissonance research, we know that receiving disconfirming evidence puts one
into a negative, phenomenologically distinct, motivational state; in other words, receiving counteratti-
tudinal information actually causes discomfort—it hurts (Elliot & Devine, 1994). People will then
change their attitudes not to adjust them in line with a norm of truth (pace Velleman, 2000), but to
escape psychological discomfort. Returning to the religious believers in Batson (1975), those who
believed that Jesus was the Son of God but did not believe the counterattitudinal article did not ratio-
nally need to adjust their belief in Jesus: the dissonance they felt from reading the article caused them
to reject the veracity of the article. But those who accepted the veracity of the article and antecedently
believed in Jesus were put into an extremely dissonant state. They resolved this dissonance by reaf-
firming their antecedent belief, and increasing their belief in Jesus. Such adjustment is consistent with
what we know of the laws of belief (Quilty-Dunn & Mandelbaum, 2017): people will adjust their
beliefs to avoid psychological discomfort. And it is this fact that is the basis of the psychological
20 An anonymous reviewer suggests that perhaps one could have a hierarchical Bayes net set up such that when one had a very strong
prior for P then not-P would be so unlikely that if it arose one would assume that it must be due to a confounding factor. Perhaps one
might reason: “People would only try to fool me into thinking God does not exist if he really does exist”. Similarly, if a proponent of evo-
lution goes to a Creationist website, that person might end up raising their belief in evolution. In fact, reasoning like this is fairly common,
for when one is reading counterattitudinal information one is also coming up with counterarguments, and these counterarguments tend to
be convincing to the person who came up with them (which is why people end up being more convinced by counterattitudinal information
when they are under load, for they do not have the mental bandwidth to create the counterarguments—see Festinger & Maccoby, 1964;
Mandelbaum, 2014). But these explanations would not work for the Bayesian in the case at hand, for it is only the people who accept that
the evidence is legitimate that end up increasing their belief; in the reviewer's example, the evidence is rejected.
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immune system (Gilbert, 2006). Among whatever other laws there are about belief change, we have
reason to believe that there is a basic psychological immune system at work, constantly adjusting
beliefs to ward off serious threats to one's sense of self.
Such adjustments do not just happen for any old counterattitudinal information. Just as the physi-
cal immune system does not get set off for just any infection, so too the threat that sets off the psy-
chological immune system must be substantial. That is, the disconfirming information must attack
beliefs that are strongly held in a subjectively important way—in other words, beliefs that one self-
identifies with. The more the person self-identifies with a certain belief, the more likely the psycho-
logical immune system will be activated when that belief is under attack.
To their credit, some Bayesians have noticed the connection between perverse updating and
strength of belief. For instance, Jern et al. (2014) note:
A similar result was reported by McHoskey (1995), who asked supporters of the official
account of the JFK assassination and supporters of an alternative conspiracy account to
read a summary of arguments for each account. Those with strong prior beliefs diverged
and those with weak prior beliefs did not. The Bayes nets presented in this
section cannot account for the fact that only the participants in these studies with strong
prior beliefs diverged (Jern et al., 2014, p. 213).
The psychological immune system hypothesis can explain the results that Bayes nets could not
model, for it interprets the counterattitudinal evidence as threats to the self that have to be warded
off; the greater the threat, the greater the response. Just like the physical immune system, the psycho-
logical one works the strongest when the threat is greatest.21.
With the theory in hand, we can now break the gridlock that has undergirded so much of the
Bayesian debate. For example, Bowers and Davis (2012) point out that if people were updating as
Bayesians, then soccer goalies should act differently than they do. On penalty kicks, goalies should
wait to jump until the ball is kicked. But doing so is rare: most goalies guess which way the ball will
be kicked and jump before the kick. Nevertheless, Bayesians have a response to this apparently sub-
optimal behavior. They argue that it is actually optimal once you understand what goalies are actually
maximizing, which is not just goals allowed but instead regret (Bar-Eli, Azar & Lurie, 2009). Bar-Eli
et al. argue that goalies are calculating not only the goals they will allow, but also their reaction to
the outcome. Roughly, Bar-Eli et al. reason that the goalies will regret not jumping early more than
jumping early. Since they are trying to optimize both the goals stopped and their future regret, they
will tend to jump early even if that is a worse strategy for stopping goals.
21 A reviewer leveled the criticism that it seems unfair to put the psychological immune system and Bayesianism on the same footing,
for the former is a qualitative theory while the other is quantitative. Although this seems prima facie true, it is a bit of a red herring.
The psychological immune system piggybacks on dissonance theory which contains the venerable dissonance equation: (Dissonance
Magnitude = SUM [all discrepant cognition × importance]/SUM [all consonant cognition x importance]). This equation allows for
quantitative predictions only after operationalization of the consonance, dissonance and importance. But this is not all that dissimilar
from Bayesianism, which needs operationalizations of the hypotheses and evidence (to say nothing of likelihood functions). The differ-
ence between these theories is not, in my eyes, how quantitative the theories are but how frequently people have in fact modeled them
quantitatively. Dissonance theory tends to not have practitioners who have backgrounds in modeling but that is a contingent fact of the
people, not the theories. In any case, the question at hand is about descriptive and explanatory accuracy, not about quantitative preci-
sion. The Immune System hypothesis can handle some important facts about belief updating (disconfirmation-based polarization),
while Bayesianism cannot. But it is worth noting that dissonance theory is used to make concrete predictions (see, for example, Coo-
per's, 2007 overview for examples. For other non-Bayesian “irrational” modeling examples sympathetic to theories like the psychologi-
cal immune system, see Eil & Rao, 2011, and Mobius, Niederle, Niehaus & Rosenblat, 2011). Nevertheless, there is no doubt that part
of what is so impressive about Bayesianism is its quantitative power and precision (though that is also the source of some of the criti-
cisms of the theory, for example, Endress, 2013 and Jones & Love, 2011).
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Attempting to rectify this situation is a difficult business. But it can be sidestepped—as opposed
to deciding which explanations are ad hoc, which priors are actually derived and used, which ends
are at play in which cases, and so on, we have found a set of cases where belief updating itself is per-
verse. Belief disconfirmation-based updating—raising one's credence that P after accepting not-P—is
the one fixed point that no Bayesian can allow.
5 | LOOKING BACK AND WRAPPING UP
Now that the psychological immune system hypothesis is on the table, we can interpret some earlier
effects in the light of it. Belief polarization due to biased assimilation also appears to be due to the
psychological immune system. Since encountering disconfirming evidence hurts (and encountering
confirmatory information feels good) selective exposure is the psychological immune system work-
ing prophylactically. Likewise, in differential scrutiny cases one is motivated to scrutinize and reject
the disconfirming information (while being motivated to just passively accept the confirming infor-
mation) in order to keep one's beliefs intact.
Similarly, in cases where one's antecedent strength of belief is middling, the psychological
immune system would predict effects that are closer to belief perseverance than belief polarization. In
these cases, the beliefs in question (e.g., the relation between being a firefighter and one's risk prefer-
ences) are not ones that people deeply self-identify with. Thus, the threat is not large enough to need
to reaffirm and increase the strength of belief, so one sees little increase in credence.22 The beliefs
here persist because it feels easier to do so than to change one's beliefs. Take, for instance, a case in
which a subject is asked to figure out probabilities that a chip will be taken from a bag. Once partici-
pants form their initial belief, it is easier for them to just persist in this belief than to update based on
incoming information, especially when participants do not particularly care about the contents of the
particular beliefs under disconfirmation.23
Which brings us to the core of the psychological immune system. The concept of a psychological
immune system takes part in a tradition running from Freud through Festinger, Aronson, and Gilbert:
it understands the workings of cognition through principles of cognitive economy—the beliefs one
changes (or keeps) are due to what feels easiest to do while keeping one's self-image intact. Similarly,
like Freud's unconscious and dissonance theory, the psychological immune system gives cognition
an engine: one can leverage the fact that inconsistencies hurt to explain how the shape of one's web
of belief will change. In particular, the psychological immune system adds the notion of the self as
the key to understanding what sorts of inconsistencies hurt the most: ones that challenge the sense of
22 Measurement-theoretically this is surprising: the more middling the antecedent beliefs are, the more space they have to move on the
scale post-disconfirmation. Hence, the null hypothesis should be that one would expect more measurable polarization from middling
than extreme attitudes. This makes the existence of belief disconfirmation effects all the more astounding for most of these subjects are
near ceiling in their attitudes to begin with. Since the stronger one holds a belief, the more likely they are to polarize after receiving dis-
confirming evidence, detecting such effects are less likely because of ceiling effects in attitude operationalization.
23 If one combines the psychological immune system with a theory in which merely entertaining a hypothesis raises the credence in
the hypothesis (e.g., Mandelbaum, 2014), then one can explain an even broader set of findings that were previously deemed to be the
result of performance constraints. For example, Pitz, Downing and Reinhold (1967) found that “The change towards certainty follow-
ing a confirming event was greater than change towards uncertainty following a disconfirming event” and that “many subjects contin-
ued to revise their probability estimates upwards, or else left them unchanged, following a single disconfirming event” (p. 391). If one
assumes that merely contemplating the hypothesis raises the credence then we do not have to conclude, as Pitz et al. do, that “the prob-
ability estimation task is too unfamiliar and complex to be meaningful”, but instead that the subjects' beliefs adjust based on what feels
easiest (p. 391). That said, the psychological immune system would expect different results for more motivated subjects, or for subjects
who did self-identify with the task (if say, they thought the task reflected their intellectual competence).
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self. Inconsistencies due to beliefs one self-identifies with are the ones that cause the most drive to
ward off psychological threats.
This is not to say that there are not other laws of belief unconnected to the psychological immune
system that may be lurking in cognition. Just as there are multiple disconnected processes with their
own laws and generalizations to be had in perception, the same can be true in cognition. I am confi-
dent there are laws of belief beyond the psychological immune system—for example, laws of belief
acquisition that are orthogonal to the psychological immune system (Mandelbaum, 2014). Perhaps
some other laws of updating align with truth tracking, or even Bayesian updating. Perhaps for beliefs
that are very distantly related to the self, one can update in the way Bayesians predict.
Regardless of whether there are other laws of belief, one can glean more general lessons from this
story. The first is that Quine was wrong: the center of one's web of belief is not constituted by beliefs
that are necessarily true but rather by the beliefs with which one self-identifies. Outside of academic
philosophy, people do not care that 2 + 2 = 4 in all possible worlds, but people absolutely do care
that they are seen as moral, smart, and competent (Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992). Try to convince the
average person that there are worlds in which the laws of arithmetic do not hold by telling them that
there are mathematicians who have shown this, and that person will probably shrug their shoulders.
But try to convince the average person that highly trained ethicists have discovered that they are
extremely immoral, and you should be ready for a quarrel. The psychological immune system inverts
Quine's web, putting highly contingent propositions—that we are good, smart, competent people—at
the center of the web, while banishing truths that have little to do with the self to the periphery.
The second major moral of the psychological immune system is that Imperial Bayesianism is
false, and Local Bayesianism is false at least when it comes to belief updating. And since belief
updating is the natural home for Bayesianism, this should gives us pause when considering the mas-
sive Bayesian takeover that is prophesied to happen in cognitive science. Ironically, it is not entirely
implausible that we end up with a picture of the mind in which the faculties of sensation and percep-
tion are the home of Bayesian updating (Girshick et al., 2011; Rescorla, 2016) while the workings of
cognition bend away from Bayes and towards conceptions of the self.
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